After the war with Germany ended in 1945, the Soviet Union turned against Japan and took Manchuria and the Kurile Islands. The Manchurian war has been largely regarded as an example of Soviet opportunism, and that's partly what it was.
The Japanese occupation army retained its fighting spirit but was exhausted and drained of material and personnel by years of defeat in the Pacific. The Soviets, on the other hand, although having suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans, were now operating at full strength and were flushed with victory. Their troops outnumbered the Japanese, they had twice the number of aircraft, and five times the number of modern tanks.
But it was no walk in the park, and there was more to it than Stalin's drive for territory. The Japanese and Russians had engaged in sometimes prolonged and bloody border skirmishes since the 1930s. Stalin had to strip the border of its troops when the Soviet Union was invaded by the Germans, but by that time the Japanese were busy elsewhere. The Kurile Islands (from which the attack on Pearl Harbor had been launched) had been Russian soil until lost in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. That many people would care about the barren, windswept Kuriles is a good argument against materialism.
And however weak the Japanese forces, Manchuria itself -- about the same size as Western Europe -- was extremely difficult terrain and presented any attackers with formidable obstacles. There is some footage of a tiny thread of marching troops and camel-drawn wagons winding its way among bluffs and rounded cliffs that are so imposing that, if they were located in America, they would have been its first National Monument.
Mountains aside, some of the Soviet armies had to cross the desert and, after that, wade through the swamps that surrounded the central plains and immobilized vehicles. The Japanese fought as well as they could but were eventually driven out. Stalin kept the Kuriles and handed Manchuria back to the Chinese.
It's not really very exciting and that's one of the reasons we hear so little about it -- that and the fact that the opposing parties both were animated by values antithetical to those of the West. It isn't as well done as some other entries in the series. There are many minutes of excerpts from American propaganda films that provide background information about "the Japs." That's a little lazy. And in the section on "Weapons," we get to know a bit about Japanese fighters and tanks, neither of which is ever heard about again.
Finally, the battle in Manchuria was in no way a pivotal point in the war. By that time, the Summer and Fall of 1945, the Japanese had been virtually defeated. And for all the immense difficulties with the terrain, there was never any question of Soviet victory and little to be gained except whatever warm glow a victor feels after vanquishing an opponent -- no oil fields, no iron mines, no big cities, nothing but dinosaur eggs.
The Japanese occupation army retained its fighting spirit but was exhausted and drained of material and personnel by years of defeat in the Pacific. The Soviets, on the other hand, although having suffered greatly at the hands of the Germans, were now operating at full strength and were flushed with victory. Their troops outnumbered the Japanese, they had twice the number of aircraft, and five times the number of modern tanks.
But it was no walk in the park, and there was more to it than Stalin's drive for territory. The Japanese and Russians had engaged in sometimes prolonged and bloody border skirmishes since the 1930s. Stalin had to strip the border of its troops when the Soviet Union was invaded by the Germans, but by that time the Japanese were busy elsewhere. The Kurile Islands (from which the attack on Pearl Harbor had been launched) had been Russian soil until lost in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. That many people would care about the barren, windswept Kuriles is a good argument against materialism.
And however weak the Japanese forces, Manchuria itself -- about the same size as Western Europe -- was extremely difficult terrain and presented any attackers with formidable obstacles. There is some footage of a tiny thread of marching troops and camel-drawn wagons winding its way among bluffs and rounded cliffs that are so imposing that, if they were located in America, they would have been its first National Monument.
Mountains aside, some of the Soviet armies had to cross the desert and, after that, wade through the swamps that surrounded the central plains and immobilized vehicles. The Japanese fought as well as they could but were eventually driven out. Stalin kept the Kuriles and handed Manchuria back to the Chinese.
It's not really very exciting and that's one of the reasons we hear so little about it -- that and the fact that the opposing parties both were animated by values antithetical to those of the West. It isn't as well done as some other entries in the series. There are many minutes of excerpts from American propaganda films that provide background information about "the Japs." That's a little lazy. And in the section on "Weapons," we get to know a bit about Japanese fighters and tanks, neither of which is ever heard about again.
Finally, the battle in Manchuria was in no way a pivotal point in the war. By that time, the Summer and Fall of 1945, the Japanese had been virtually defeated. And for all the immense difficulties with the terrain, there was never any question of Soviet victory and little to be gained except whatever warm glow a victor feels after vanquishing an opponent -- no oil fields, no iron mines, no big cities, nothing but dinosaur eggs.
